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The social dynamics around shared sanitation in an
informal settlement of Lusaka, Zambia
Jenala Chipungu, James B. Tidwell, Roma Chilengi, Valerie Curtis
and Robert Aunger
ABSTRACT
This study explored the social dynamics affecting collective management of shared sanitation in the
Bauleni compound of Lusaka, Zambia. In-depth interviews were conducted with landlords (n¼ 33)
and tenants (n¼ 33). Elinor Ostrom’s eight design principles for the management of common-pool
resources was used as a framework to analyse the data. Social capital within plots was also
assessed. Pit latrines were predominantly shared by landlords and tenants on residential plots.
However, unwelcome non-plot members also used the latrines due to a lack of physical boundaries.
Not all plot members fulﬁlled their cleaning responsibilities equally, thereby compromising the
intended beneﬁts for those conforming. Landlords typically decided on latrine improvements
independent of tenants. Latrines were not systematically monitored or maintained, but punishment
for non-conformers was proportionate to the level of infraction. There was no system in place for
conﬂict resolution, nor local organizations to regulate the management of sanitation. Lastly, there
were few enterprises associated with peri-urban sanitation. Social capital was moderately high, and
tenants were willing to invest money into improving sanitation. The social dynamics illuminated here
provide an important basis for the development of a behavioural intervention targeted towards
improving urban sanitation.
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INTRODUCTION
Globally, progress towards the achievement of universal
sanitation remains slow. According to the most recent
Joint Monitoring Programme report, 2.3 billion people
lack access to basic sanitation – toilets built to safely separ-
ate excreta from human contact (WHO & UNICEF ).
Sub-Saharan African countries continue to suffer dispro-
portionately from poor sanitation with 72% of their
population lacking access to basic sanitation (WHO &
UNICEF ). This situation is only worsening as shown
with the increase of 261 million people using unimproved
facilities from the period 1990–2015 (WHO ). Poor
sanitation is associated with infectious diseases, the most
common being diarrhoea (Mara et al. ). In Zambia,
16% of children under the age of ﬁve experience episodes
of diarrhoea annually and 66% of these episodes were
severe and required medical attention (Central Statistical
Office (CSO) (Zambia) ). Additionally, 390,000 Zam-
bian children died as a result of diarrhoea in 2015 (You
et al. ).
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution Licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), which permits copying
and redistribution for non-commercial purposes with no derivatives,
provided the original work is properly cited (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Improved sanitation refers to the hygienic separation of
excreta from human contact (WHO & UNICEF ). How-
ever, 43% of Zambians live in high density urban areas and
largely depend on onsite sanitation that may fail to protect
them from excreta (WHO ). Pit latrines in these areas
are poorly built, lacking a concrete lining or an adequate
slab, thereby contaminating groundwater and the soil
(Kennedy-Walker et al. ). Furthermore, 24% of toilets in
urban Zambia are used by more than one household in a
given residential plot (WHO ). These toilets are referred
to as shared household toilets, which are different from com-
munity toilets (shared by many households in a community)
and public toilets (open to the public) (Cardone et al. ).
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) number 6.2 empha-
sizes universal access to individual household toilets deﬁned
as use by a single household, i.e., improved sanitation that is
not shared by the year 2030. This target seems ambitious in
view of the slow progress being made around sanitation and
ongoing debate about whether shared sanitation must always
be considered ‘limited’ (Evans et al. ). Therefore, inter-
mediate efforts should consider ways to make currently
shared sanitation more hygienic and relevant for public
health. To this end, it is important to examine the social
dynamics around shared sanitation and the potential it has
to contribute to adequate hygiene standards.
Elinor Ostrom’s work on common-pool resource (CPR)
management (Ostrom ) provides a foundation for
exploring the social dynamics surrounding shared sani-
tation. CPRs are resources that have multiple users, for
which it is difﬁcult to exclude users and the use by one
user decreases resource beneﬁts or enjoyment for other
users (Steins & Edwards ). Various projects concerning
shared resources have been instigated based on CPR theory
and are typically referred to as ‘commons projects’ (Saun-
ders ). In developing countries, commons projects
have been adopted to promote ownership and sustainability
among local institutions by allowing them to set rules and
manage their own local resources with minimal government
intervention (Roe et al. ). The assumption underlying
CPR-based programmes is that local communities are motiv-
ated to cooperate with one another and manage and use
their resources fairly in exchange for a perceived beneﬁt.
To this end, Ostrom identiﬁed a set of principles by which
a community can manage such a resource so that it is not
overused and consequently destroyed, without recourse to
a higher-level regulatory body. Ostrom’s eight principles
(Table 1) have been successfully applied to a variety of
types of common-pool resources – a large review of 91
studies that investigated Ostrom’s principles concluded
that they are empirically supported and should be used as
a framework to understand the complexities involved in
the management of shared resources (Cox et al. ).
Ostrom hypothesized that in order for a CPR to be used
sustainably and efﬁciently: (1) there should be set rules that
Table 1 | Ostrom’s design principles for managing a common-pool resource
1. Clearly Deﬁned Boundaries
Individuals or households with rights to withdraw resource units
from the common-pool resource are clearly deﬁned, as are its
boundaries
2. Congruence
A. Appropriation rules deﬁne a distribution of beneﬁts that is
roughly proportionate to the costs imposed by provision rules
B. Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or
quantity of resource units are appropriate for local conditions
3. Collective-Choice Arrangements
Most individuals affected by rules regulating operation of the
resource can participate in modifying those rules
4. Monitoring
Monitors, who actively audit common-pool resource conditions
and appropriator behaviour, are accountable to the
appropriators and/or are the appropriators themselves
5. Graduated Sanctions
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to receive
graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context
of the offence) from other appropriators, from ofﬁcials
accountable to these appropriators, or from both
6. Conﬂict-Resolution Mechanisms
Appropriators and their ofﬁcials have rapid access to low-cost,
local arenas to resolve conﬂict among appropriators or between
appropriators and ofﬁcials
7. Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not
challenged by external governmental authorities
8. Nested Enterprises
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conﬂict
resolution and governance activities are organized in multiple
layers of enterprises, nested from the lowest level up to the entire
interconnected system
Adapted from Ostrom (2002).
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set boundaries of the shared resource; (2) users should beneﬁt
in proportion to the investment theymake to uphold the rules;
(3) decision-making on the shared resource should be partici-
patory and inclusive of all users; (4) the condition and use of
the shared resource should be monitored; (5) there should
be a negative consequence for failure to adhere to the rules
around the shared resource which should be graduated to
the size of the offence; (6) mechanisms to resolve conﬂicts
must be in place; (7) users should be able to manage the
shared resource with minimal government interference; and
(8) there should be established means for supporting manage-
ment of the shared resource at all levels of organization. These
principles demonstrate bothmacro andmicro level inﬂuences
on the management of a CPR.
A shared toilet within a residential plot can be considered
a CPR in that it is used by many people to fulﬁl a valuable
need (disposal of excreta) but may be unregulated and over-
used and subsequently destroyed. Ostrom’s eight principles
for managing common-pool resources have previously been
used in Kenya to investigate determinants for the quality of
shared sanitation (Simiyu et al. b). The study found that
the quality of a toilet deteriorated as the number of people
using it increased. Despite the presence of boundaries, collec-
tive decision-making and monitoring of the toilet, the duty
rota for cleaning the toilet did not function as people did
not clean the toilet when they were supposed to.
Additionally, the social dilemma framework has been
used to explore the factors contributing to cooperation and
collective action in shared toilet cleaning (Tumwebaze &
Mosler b). Based on a number of existing studies, they
reported 11 factors including trust, group size, gender and
motives, as inﬂuencing cooperation and collective action.
A third perspective is also relevant to this discussion of
sanitation management and related to Ostrom’s principles:
social capital. Social capital is deﬁned as a network of relation-
ships held together by trust, reciprocity, collective action and
networking (Johnson ). People rely on one another for
resources that will help them in various ways, including ﬁnan-
cial and emotional well-being. A study conducted in rural
Kenya found that higher social capital is important in promot-
ing collective action for water and sanitation programmes
(Bisung et al. ). This and other studies demonstrate the
need for social capital as a catalyst for improved sanitation
in high density communities (Wakefield et al. ).
This study applies both Ostrom’s eight principles and
the social capital perspective to the problem of understand-
ing the dynamics underlying shared toilet construction,
maintenance, and improvement. The ﬁndings from this
study are relevant for toilet improvement interventions and
can be used to assess Zambia’s likelihood of improving the
quality of its shared sanitation systems.
METHODS
Study setting and population
The study was conducted in a peri-urban area located in
Lusaka, Zambia called Bauleni compound. This area is a typi-
cal peri-urban environment with a population of 64,000
people, divided into crowded, unplanned plots, typically
consisting of a landlord and several tenant households.
Sanitation is typically provided at plot level. In order to select
a study area within Bauleni, a map of the area was obtained
from Google Earth and divided into zones. Visibly crowded
zones were identiﬁed and one of these areas (Zone A) was
selected for exploration to avoid contaminating a planned
future trial in the compound (Appendix, available with the
online version of this paper). Plots on which both landlords
and tenants lived were chosen for this study.
Data collection
Exploratory qualitative research techniques were employed to
investigate CPR principles related to sanitation. In-depth, semi-
structured interviews (IDI) were used to collect information
from landlords and tenants. Toilet quality was observed
directly, and questions derived from Ostrom’s eight principles
(Table 1)were used to elicit responses around the factors under-
lying toilet construction, maintenance and improvement.
We further asked questions around the levels of social
capital on the plot. Quantitative indicators of social capital
measured various dimensions of the construct, such as trust
(can you leave your child with another plot member?), soli-
darity (are you willing to help another plot member on the
plot?), and the effect of group afﬁliation (do you trust your
tribe member as much as others?). These indicators were
adapted to this peri-urban setting from a study on rural sani-
tation in Indonesia (Cameron et al. ).
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Sample size and recruitment
A sample of 33 landlords and 33 tenants was acquired prior
to reaching information saturation (Malterud et al. ).
Purposive sampling was used to collect data from equal
numbers of landlords and tenants as well as to ensure that
at least one-third of respondents were male. Plot members
found at home were asked if there was a resident landlord
present; if so, the landlord was identiﬁed and asked to par-
ticipate in the study. If not, the tenant was asked to
participate. If there was no resident landlord present,
research assistants would ask whoever was present whether
they knew of a resident landlord within the zone.
Ethical considerations
The study was approved by the University of Zambia Biome-
dical Research Ethics Committee (UNZABREC) (ref: 023-
06-16) and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine (LSHTM) Ethics Committee (ref: 11714). Written
consent was obtained from all participants prior to conduct-
ing the interviews.
DATA ANALYSIS
Interviews were voice recorded and transcribed. Framework
analysis was used to analyse the data (Malterud et al. ).
Transcripts were ﬁrst broadly coded by each Ostrom’s prin-
ciple (which represented the main themes) using NVIVO
10. Codes were subsequently reﬁned to identify differences
in sanitation cleaning, construction, maintenance and
improvement. This information was transferred to Excel
for further analysis.
RESULTS
A total of 44 females and 22 males were interviewed on 66
plots. Landlords were generally older than tenants and had
lived on their plots longer than the tenants (median time 20
years vs 1 year 4 months). There was a median of 4 tenants’
houses and 15 people on a plot; these people typically
shared one pit latrine.
Clearly deﬁned boundaries
Boundaries of who could use a plot’s toilet were deﬁned by
fences surrounding the plot, social pressure, and locks on
toilet doors. Interviewees indicated that it was generally
socially unacceptable for non-plot members to use the toi-
lets. Participants believed that an outside lock was
necessary to effectively exclude non-plot members. How-
ever, in practice, many toilets did not have outside locks.
‘Behind our toilet there is a bar that does not have a toilet.
When we are sleeping people from the bar come and use
the toilet and mess it up very badly because there is no
door or lock’ (Tenant).
There were situations where some neighbours who did not
have toilets asked either a tenant or the landlord for per-
mission to use the toilet on their plot. If the neighbour had a
good relationship with the tenant or landlord, this permission
was granted, and seemed not to lead to conﬂict within the plot.
In caseswhere the neighbourswere not friendswith the tenant
or landlord, permission, if sought, was not granted.
Congruence of costs and beneﬁts
Enjoying the beneﬁts of a sanitation facility entails the need
to maintain its level of cleanliness. There are quite clear
rules on the roles that plot members play relating to sustain-
ing the CPR: landlords were responsible for toilet
construction (including improvement) and physical main-
tenance. Some tenants willingly contributed their time and
labour to non-technical jobs like digging a pit; only a few
tenants contributed their own money. Generally, tenants
had the responsibility of cleaning the toilets and an unwrit-
ten rota was in place on most plots.
‘It is my responsibility to do the repairs for the toilet, for
example right now I’m tiling the toilet. Even if it gets
full it’s my responsibility to make sure I empty it, because
if I am going to keep a tenant on my plot, then that person
will need a toilet’ (Landlord).
In some cases, tenants were solely responsible for cleaning
the toilet while in other cases both landlords and tenants
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were held responsible. Many tenants strongly felt that land-
lords should also clean the toilet in order to set an example.
On plots that had more than one tenant household, cleaning
responsibilities were shared between the households, with
each being given an equal number of days or weeks to
clean the toilet. However, tenants often felt that their toilet
was dirty because fellow tenants did not put in enough
effort to clean the toilet when it was their turn. Landlords
equally complained about tenants not cleaning the toilet
when they were supposed to, especially in the case of
male tenants.
‘There’s a problem on this plot, some of us clean the toilet
but others refuse to clean. Even when it comes to sweep-
ing [the toilet], some of us sweep and others don’t, so the
landlord needs to do something about this situation’
(Tenant).
The number of days given for cleaning did not depend on the
size of the household. Thus, a single male/female would have
the responsibility of cleaning for the same number of days as a
household with a family, demonstrating some lack of congru-
ence. There are also cultural rules that interfere with a fair
burden being placed on all plot members. In particular,
many participants, in general, believed that the toilet should
not be cleaned by a man as it was not culturally acceptable
for a man to clean bodily waste including urine, faeces or
menstrual blood, especially from a woman. However, not
all participants agreed with this cultural norm.
Some tenants were displeased at the state of their toilets
and complained about the length of time it took for their
landlords to repair or improve them. This caused some to
leave the plot – the ultimate expression of a perceived imbal-
ance between contribution to, and beneﬁts derived from, the
toilet – while others chose to stay because they did not have
the ﬁnancial capacity to live on a plot with a better toilet.
Collective choice arrangements for toilet improvements
and repairs
Over the longer term, continuing to enjoy the beneﬁts of sani-
tation on the plot depends on collective agreements about
investments such as new construction or repair (e.g., after
ﬂooding). Decisions around toilet improvements were made
solely by the landlords, typically without consulting tenants.
The only times that landlords reported speaking to tenants
about sanitation concerned enforcing the cleaning rota, com-
plaining about the cleanliness of the toilets or resolving a
disagreement between tenants. On plots where tenants got
along, they came together to solve problems around sani-
tation by contributing their time, money or effort.
‘On this plot, we get along. I remember when the landlord
was building a toilet, we knew it would take about 3
months to build. So as tenants, we came together and held
a meeting with the landlord to tell him that the toilet will
take too long to build and we will be inconvenienced. We
decided to all help with building the toilet, so those who
were available put in their time and effort to build our cur-
rent toilet and we completed this job quickly’ (Tenant).
However, on plots where there was poor cohesion, tenants
individually complained to the landlord (as in the example
cited under conﬂict resolution mechanisms below).
Monitoring of cleanliness
Another important principle to ensure continued availability
of a CPR is policing of its current state and identifying who
is responsible for that state. In the case of sanitation, the cur-
rent state is largely about cleanliness. Both landlord and
tenants suggested that they inspected the toilet to see
whether it was clean. However, not all landlords monitored
the toilet regularly and the few that did, did so only hapha-
zardly. When landlords found the toilet dirty, they reported
that they would talk to the tenant about it and tell them to
clean it. However, not all tenants would clean the toilet
even after being told. Tenants would also remind fellow
tenants to clean the toilet when they had not cleaned it.
Some tenants said when they would go in to use the toilet,
they were able to see whether it was clean or not and
would either clean it themselves or ask the person respon-
sible to clean it, if they knew who it was, which was rare.
One tenant took this task very seriously:
‘I do the monitoring myself, I go to the toilet to see
whether its clean. If it’s dirty, I organise a meeting with
all the tenants and we discuss cleanliness. I do this
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because many people are using the same toilet and can
spread disease. So, I talk to them as a group because we
are many and I cannot know who has not cleaned the
toilet or messed it up’ (Tenant).
Graduated sanctions
When things go awry, there must be a mechanism to ensure
that those that deviate from the rules of the system are pun-
ished. However, for the system to work properly, the
punishment must be of appropriate severity; otherwise, a
sense of fairness in the punishments will be lost. In Bauleni,
landlords and tenants reported that no serious punishments
occur as a result of not cleaning the toilet. Some landlords
had threatened to evict tenants if they leave it dirty. Tenants
on such plots were aware of these threats and said their
landlord was serious about keeping the toilet clean. How-
ever, none had actually evicted anyone on such grounds,
which would be disproportionate punishment. Tenants on
a plot also reported gossiping (social sanction) about other
tenants who did not keep the toilet clean. The only
common punishment given for sanitation-related offences
was for tenants to replace anything they broke, such as a
toilet lock. Tenants also report using scolding as a means
of excluding outsiders seen to intrude.
Conﬂict-resolution mechanisms
Conﬂicts inevitably arise when managing a shared resource
and having appropriate mechanisms in place is important
to resolve conﬂicts and avoid escalation. Conﬂict was more
common between tenants than between landlords and
tenants. Electricity, solid wastemanagement and toilet clean-
ing were the most frequently reported sources of conﬂict.
Electricity on a plot was shared and landlords charged their
tenants a standard amount towards meeting the electricity
bill. While tenants were supposed to pay their electricity on
a particular day of the month, not all tenants paid on this par-
ticular day, which could incite conﬂict. Additionally, not all
tenants cleaned the toilet when they were supposed to,
which also led to conﬂict among tenants and, in a few
cases, between landlords and tenants. Tenants also reported
conﬂict as a result of personality clashes, treatment of
children, noise pollution and solid waste disposal, where
households paid for their own solid waste, but others would
sneak their waste into others’ piles. Conﬂict was usually
manifested through ceasing communication, arguments or
physical ﬁghts. Landlords were usually approached to sort
out conﬂicts between tenants, typically by sitting the
aggrieved person down, talking through the problem and
ﬁnding a solution. On plots with an older person, that
person could take the responsibility to resolve the conﬂict
whether they were a landlord or tenant. However, in some
cases where conﬂict was not resolved the tenant either left
the plot or was evicted by the landlord.
‘We always argue with the tenant who lives there because
they don’t clean the toilet. For us to resolve this problem, I
told the landlord to give us two days each for cleaning the
toilet because that one [fellow tenant] does not clean the
toilet. At least if it’s two days, they will be forced [or held
accountable] to clean often than waiting for their week to
come…When it’s their week, the toilet will just remain
dirty. When I told the landlord, he imposed that rule so
now they are forced to clean’ (Tenant).
Minimal recognition of rights to organize
The social arrangements made to support and guide use of a
common resource must themselves be open to modiﬁcation
if they are not working. At the point that a tenant is assum-
ing occupancy, they are told of the rules around cleaning the
toilet, maintaining cleanliness on the plot, rent payment
days and garbage disposal. However, these were not
bound by any formal agreements. Additionally, both land-
lords and tenants reported not knowing any laws or
regulations regarding landlord and tenant agreements
around sanitation. The only known regulation was a law
against loud noise in the form of music played at night.
Nested enterprises
Finally, residential plots are embedded in a larger commu-
nity that might provide support, or signiﬁcantly constrain,
sanitation maintenance or improvement. An important con-
nection for plot-based sanitation is to implement faecal
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sludge management systems at the community level. How-
ever, in Bauleni, only a few landlords reported using pit
emptying services in either manual or mechanical form.
Some had only seen or heard of mechanical pit emptying
while others do not have any knowledge of pit emptying.
No one reported actually using such a service. This means
that expensive emptying of toilets is necessary, leading to a
failure of the sanitation system when a landlord delays emp-
tying the toilet or constructing a new one.
Social capital
Respondents generally reported high levels of willingness to
work together with those on the plot, but this was less
common in practice. 97% of participants were willing to
help plot members who were in need and the majority
reported willing to contribute time (89%) and money
(84%) to improve the plot. 74% of tenants said they were
willing to contribute money to improve the sanitation on
their plot. With respect to child care, 77% of all participants
said they could leave their child with other plot members if
they left for a few hours. However, with respect to money,
only 43% believed plot members would return money to
them if they happened to drop it, and trust for community
members outside the plot was much lower. Asked about
practices, only 49% agreed that other plot members actually
contributed money for plot improvement while 67% felt they
worked together to improve a plot. Landlords were gener-
ally more willing to contribute materially to plot welfare.
In comparison to landlords, tenants were much more trust-
ing of others on the plot.
DISCUSSION
On-site sanitation, which is usually shared by landlords and
tenants in Bauleni, can be analysed using Ostrom’s prin-
ciples for CPR management, contributing to understanding
why the management of shared toilets may fail.
With respect to clearly deﬁned boundaries, the ﬁrst prin-
ciple, we learned that landlords and tenants generally do not
allow outsiders to use the toilet on their plot. However, toilet
intrusion was hard to manage as most plots were not
enclosed by a fence and had no outside lock on their toilets
to prevent use by outsiders. This may pose a public health
concern in terms of increased risk of diarrhoeal disease
due to an increase in the number of users (Heijnen et al.
). In order to protect the toilet from use by unwanted
people, a suggested strategy would be to inﬂuence landlords
to work towards setting clear boundaries for toilet use, both
physical (solid fence and door lock) and social (disapproval
of intruders). As the owners of the land, these boundaries
should be the sole responsibility of the landlords to enforce
and must be well communicated to in-plot members.
Second, there should be a set of rules for those sharing a
sanitation system and there should be congruence between
cost and beneﬁt in applying these rules (Ostrom ). In
Bauleni compound, just as in urban informal settlements
in Kenya and Ghana, landlords are responsible for the phys-
ical components of a toilet (Jenkins & Scott ; Simiyu
et al. a). However, there was incongruence in cleaning
practices related to the lack of a monitoring system and
agreed upon consequences for non-compliance. The lack
of accountability in maintaining a toilet allowed tenants to
‘cheat’ in terms of not fulﬁlling their responsibility
(Ostrom ). Sanctions, although very limited, were
imposed at a level related to the degree of rule-breaking,
such as being scolded or the subject of gossip. Hence,
close monitoring of the duty rota and the dynamics of
who does the monitoring need discussion and agreement,
as does the type of punishment, to ensure it does not infringe
upon human rights as in the case of Community-led total
sanitation (CLTS) (Bartram et al. ). Therefore, strategies
for collective decision-making around rules and punish-
ments among plot members are needed to ensure that the
rights and responsibilities of all involved are respected.
Tenants’ perceived inability to express dissatisfaction
may be inﬂuenced by the unbalanced landlord–tenant
relationship, which is commonly believed to be exploitative
in nature, with tenants being suppressed and subjected to
poor conditions including lack of proper sanitation (Scott
). Ostrom’s framework takes into consideration the
effect of disproportionate power relations, in this case with
landlords having more power as rent receivers than tenants
as rent givers (Ostrom ). Tenants in a peri-urban area of
Kigali felt this way, saying that their landlords were more
concerned about making money than improving toilets
(Tsinda et al. ). Further evidence suggests that
108 J. Chipungu et al. | The social dynamics around shared sanitation Journal of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for Development | 09.1 | 2019
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/washdev/article-pdf/9/1/102/536623/washdev0090102.pdf
by LSHTM user
on 08 May 2019
non-resident landlords are reluctant to make improvements
to the toilet as they were more interested in receiving their
rental income (Bisung et al. ). Thus, if landlords’ inter-
ests are not centred on improving toilets but on other
personal gains, shared household toilets will only deterio-
rate. Due to the effect power relations may have on the
effectiveness of a shared resource, healthy power relations
between landlords and tenants should be stipulated as a cat-
alyst for users of a shared resource. This can be achieved
through empowerment strategies for the right to organize
among tenants supplemented with regular group meetings
between landlord and tenants, where productive dialogue
is encouraged.
Conﬂict should be expected among people sharing a
resource like sanitation (Jewitt ; Tumwebaze & Mosler
a; Simiyu et al. b). Our data conﬁrmed that conﬂict
between tenants was common, especially when it concerned
a shared resource like electricity or sanitation. Landlords
and older plot members were seen primarily as conﬂict
resolvers when there was a disagreement and can be used
as part of a strategy to encourage productive dialogue. How-
ever, our ﬁndings also indicate that tenants generally think
social capital on the plot (and by extension, in the neigh-
bourhood) is higher than landlords do, perhaps because
they have greater involvement on a day-to-day basis with
each other. The exception is money: tenants are less willing
to help ﬁnancially, or to believe money will be returned to
them, within the plot. This is consistent with the distinction
in roles between landlords and tenants in terms of ﬁnancial
obligations. These data also suggest that a lack of trust
between landlords and tenants might be one reason for
the poor levels of communication and collaboration
between them, leading to weak monitoring and mainten-
ance systems for shared toilets. The study ﬁndings suggest
that residents on a plot need to build on their social capital
for them to effectively manage their shared sanitation facil-
ity. Speciﬁcally, relationships among plot members (both
landlords and tenants) should be strengthened to encourage
collective action towards managing their latrine. In order to
harness this attitude, communication between landlords
and tenants should be encouraged as a potential mechanism
towards collective decision-making around sanitation.
Effective decision-making must overcome the social,
psychological and any economic and technical barriers to
improved sanitation. Overcoming these barriers may seem
impossible; however, through strategic dialogue, social
organization within plots and with other relevant stake-
holders, plot members may be able to successfully improve
their sanitation (McGranahan & Mitlin ).
CONCLUSION
In order to reduce the negative public health effects of shared
household toilets used by both landlords and tenants, sani-
tation users should improve toilet management in a number
of ways, including strengthening boundaries around sani-
tation, establishing more effective management rules and
productive dialogue between landlords and tenants, to
improve the management of latrines. Being aware of the
social dynamics on resident landlord plots provides a basis
for the development of interventions targeting the better
maintenance and improvement of shared sanitation.
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